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THE RIGHT TO DIE: Public Health Trust v.
Wons FLORIDA MOVES AWAY FROM
MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW JERSEY TOWARD
CALIFORNIA AND MISSISSSIPPI
DESPITE Cruzan v. Harmon
Daniel R. Gordon"
I. INTRODUCTION: THm Emr.RGoENCE
OF Tim RiGlrr To Dm IN FLORIDA
In 1989, the Florida Supreme Court in Public Health Trust
of Dade County v. Wons' held that a Jehovah's Witness could
decide to refuse a blood transfusion even if that refusal is
likely to result in death.' Wons represented the culmination
of eleven years of legal developments in Florida relating to
the right to die.3 During those eleven years, the Florida courts
expanded the right to refuse life saving medical treatment.' As
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami, Florida
B.A., Haverford College; J.D., Boston College Law School.
1. 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
2. Id.
3. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980) (where the court held that a competent adult patient had the right to refuse
medical treatment); John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983), quashed on narrow grounds, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984) (court approval was not
necessary for the disconnection of extraordinary life support measures of a comotose patient
where that patient had previously expressed an intent to refuse such treatment. All that was
required was a medical determination that there was no hope of recovery); In Re
Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that the state's
interest in prolonging life is overridden by the privacy interests of a terminally ill, incompetent
child, who is wholly lacking in cognitive brain functions and whose condition is incurable and
irreversible); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied,
492 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 1986) (where the court stated that it would recognize the right to
withdraw artificial, life-sustaining measures when science and medical technology determine
that life has reached an unconscious and vegetative state); St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465
So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (where the court upheld the right of a patient to refuse
a blood transfusion on the basis of the patient's fear of an adverse reaction, religious beliefs,
and recalcitrance); Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987), aft'd, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) ( holding that the state's interest in having
children reaised by two loving parents was insufficient to overcome a patient's religious right
to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion).
4. id.
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the courts enlarged those rights, the courts were faced with
questions concerning how expansive the right to die is.
Unfortunately, the courts never faced the question of
expansiveness directly and thoroughly.5
The Florida courts depended on out of state courts,
especially Massachusetts and New Jersey courts, for doctrines
relating to the right to die,6 but that dependency involved a
narrow group of older cases without reviewing changes in out-
of-state doctrine in a disciplined fashion.7 As a result of
failing to face the issue of expansiveness directly and refusing
to review the development of doctrine in a systematic fashion,
the Florida law relating to the right to die remains unclear
even after the Wons decision.
The rationale of state courts, both Florida and outside
Florida, are particularly important in the context of the right
to die because the United States Supreme Court has agreed
5. See, e.g., Perlnutter, 362 So. 2d at 162. The District Court of Appeals limits its
holding to the facts of only that case, and then postpones for a later date considerations of
how its ruling would impact different circumstances. Id. The court seems unwilling to
provide even general guidelines for future circumstances, and tries to avoid broader
philosophical discussions about the role of the courts in making life and death medical
decisions. Id.
6. See, e.g., Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 163, the court refers to, inter alia, Superintendent
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977) (where the
court held that a patient could not be deprived of his right to refuse medical treatment solely
due to the fact that he was incompetent) and In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 335 A.2d 647 (NJ.
1976), cert. denied sub nom. Gargor v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the right of a patient to refuse extraordinary life preservation
methods could not be exercised by the guardian alone where the patient was incompetent,
unless the physician and the hospital's ethics committee, or some other like body, had
determined that there was no chance of recovery). See generally Morgan & Harty-Golder,
Constitutional Development of Judicial Criteria in Right to Die Cases: From Brain Dead to
Persistent Vegetative State, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 721 (1988); Note, The Foundations of the
Right to Die, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 235 (1987).
7. See, e.g., Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97 (Fla. 1989) where the Florida Supreme Court refers
to at least two cases cited even before Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 163, n.3. See, e.g., In re
Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 III. 2d 381, 205 N.E.2d 435
(1965). The Wons court also cites to modern Mississippi and Maryland cases, but does not
review developments in Massachusetts, New York, or New Jersey, the States originally relied
upon for doctrinal support. See, e.g., In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985); Mercy
Hospital, Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
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to review Cruzan v. Harmon8 during the 1989-90 term.9
Cruzan is a right to die case decided by the Missouri Supreme
Court which found that the United States Constitution fails to
protect a patient's guardian's choice to allow a patient to die."
Presumably, the United States Supreme Court will decide
whether the constitutionally protected right to privacy extends
to treatment refusal and withdrawal. Even if the Supreme
Court affirms the Missouri Supreme court, the impact should
be negligable in Florida and many other States, because right
to die law often is based not only on federal constitutional
grounds but also state constitutional and common law
grounds."1
This article will examine the recent Wons decision,12
the impact of Cruzan on Wons and out of state doctrinal bases
for Florida right to die law, 3 review the development of the
right to die in Florida during the past eleven years, 4 study the
Massachusetts and New Jersey cases that provided doctrine for
Florida's right to die," examine developments in California
and Mississippi law relating to the right to die, 6 and review
conflicts in Florida Law after Wons, proposing resolutions to
the conflicts by using California and Mississippi law. 7
8. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), cert granted sub noam. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
9. Cruzan, 109 S. Ct. at 3240.
10. Ciuzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417-18.
11. See infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 37-95 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 18-36 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes %-184 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 185-356 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 357-407 accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 408-472 and accompanying text.
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H. Cruzan, Wons AND THE CASES
THAT PROVIDE DOCTRNAL SUPPORT FOR Tim
RIGrr To DIE IN FLORmA
The United States Supreme Court will decide in Cruzan
v. Harmon8 whether the constitutionally protected right to
privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut9 and Roe v.
Wade2' and limited by Webster v. Reproductive Health Service2
and Bowers v.' Hardwick22 extends to treatment refusal and
withdrawal. The patient in Cruzan, an automobile accident
victim, will remain in a persistant vegetative state until her
death,' though she is not terminally ill and could survive for
as long as thirty years.24 The Missouri Supreme Court found
that the patient's "right to refuse treatment, whether that right
proceeds from a constitutional right of privacy or common law
right to refuse treatment, outweighs the immense, clear fact of
life in which the state maintains a vital interest."' The United
States Supreme Court will focus on the breadth of application
of the right of privacy.
A decision by the Supreme Court restricting the federal
constitutional right to privacy in the context of treatment
withdrawal would fail to weaken Florida right to die law and
the out-of-state doctrinal or potential doctrinal cases for that
law. The Florida law and out-of-state law is based on more
grounds than the federal constitutional and common law.'
The Florida courts have recognized a relationship between the
18. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1980).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
22. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
23. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 (1988).
24. Id. at 411.
25. Id. at 424.
26. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the guardian of an incompetent individual may exercise that individual's right
to forego artificially provided sustenance when the individual suffers from an incurable
condition, even though not in a permanent, vegetative state).
1990l
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right to refuse treatment and the freestanding privacy
protection provision of the Florida Constitution, 27 and that
relationship was strengthened in an abortion case where
Florida Supreme Court found a parental consent statute
violated a minor's right to private decision making under
Article I, § 23. 28
The out-of-state cases upon which the Florida courts
rely or potentially could rely for doctrinal support also rest on
other bases in addition to federal constitutional law.' The
Massachusetts courts treat the right to refuse medical
assistance as a strongly protected common law right?0 Though
the Massachusetts courts have never applied their state
constitution directly to treatment refusal circumstances, the
Supreme Judicial Court in a 1981 abortion funding case found
that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights protected privacy
rights to a greater degree than the Federal Constitution."
The New Jersey courts recognize that treatment refusal is
protected by New Jersey Constitution Article I, paragraph 1,32
27. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and
free from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein.
This selection shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and
meetings as provided by law." Id. See also Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 541
So. 2d 96, 101-02 (1989) (concurring opinion); Corbett v. D'Allessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); John F. Kennedy I losp. v. Bludworth, 432 So. 2d 611, 618-19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); In Re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
28. In re T.W., 543 So. 2d 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
29. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
728, 370 N.E.2d 417, 417 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 335 A.2d 647 (1976); Matter of
Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
30. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 738-39, 370 N.E.2d at 424; Commisioner of Corrections
v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452, 455 (1979) (where the state's interest in
preservation of life was counterbalanced by the defendant's interest in refusing dialysis
treatment, even where the patient had a positive prognosis if treated); Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986) (where the court allowed the wife
of a patient in a vegetative state to decide whether to discontinue artificial maintenance of
food and hydration, under the doctrine of substituted judgment).
31. Moe v. Secreatary of Administration, 365 Mass. 771, 778-80, 417 N.E.2d 387, 399-
402 (1981).
32. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 10, 355 A.2d at 647, Matter of Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348, 529
A.2d 404, 410 (1987) (where the state's interests in preserving life, preventing suicide and
safeguarding the medical profession were outweighed by the rights of a competent adult
RIGHT TO DIE
though the common law provides sufficient bases for the right
to refuse treatment.33 California also uses common law' and
state constitutional bases for the right to refuse treatment.s
Mississippi relies on Mississippi Constitution Article 3, sections
18 and 32,' the freedom of religion and inherent rights of
people provisions, to bolster the right to refuse treatment.3 7
Cruzan should not impact Florida, Massachussetts, New
Jersey, California, or Mississippi law. Wons will remain
applicable in Florida, the doctrinal support on which Wons
depends should remain valid.
III. Public Health Trust Of
Dade County v. Wons: THE
RIGHT To REFUSE TREATMENT AND To DIE
In a decision marked by disagreement within the court,"
the Florida Supreme Court in Public Health Trust of Dade
County v. Wons"9 held that a hospital patient, a relatively
young mother of two children, could refuse medical treatment
even when her life could be saved by accepting treatment and
almost certain death would ensue by refusing treatment.' The
patient, Mrs. Wons, was a 38 year old mother and a patient
patient to withdraw a life sustaining respirator).
33. Conroy, 98 NJ. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1221; Farrell, 108 N.J. at 348, 529 A.2d at 410.
34. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 206 n.20, 245
Cal. Rptr. 840, 853 n.20 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
35. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186,195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr.
297, 301 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
36. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Miss. 1985).
37. Id. at 1036.
38. See Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1979). Five
of the seven justices formed the opinion of the court, while two justices, one of whom also
joined the opinion of the court, joined in a concurring opinion, and a seventh justice stridently
dissented. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 98. The court stated that "the state's interest in maintaining a home with two
parents for the minor children does not override Mrs. Wons constitutional right of privacy
and religion." Id.
1990]
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at a public hospital' where she was being treated for
dysfunctional uterine bleeding.4" Mrs. Wons had lost over
90% of her available red blood cells, experienced extreme
blood loss from her uterus, and suffered from the insufficiency
of bone marrow for replacement of red blood cells already
lost.43 In her physician's opinion, her hematocrit had fallen so
low that without an immediate blood transfusion she would
die.'
The Circuit Court, in an emergency weekend session, 5
ordered that an immediate blood transfusion be administered.'
After receiving the blood transfusion, Mrs. Wons recovered
from her life threatening condition and was discharged from
the hospital.47 Though she recovered, she was not cured of
the underlying medical problem. '
The Florida District Court of Appeals reversed the
order of the Circuit Court, holding that Mrs. Wons possessed
a constitutional right to refuse the administration of blood.49
The court based its decision on an amalgam of constitutional,
privacy and religious freedom rights, relying on support for
the privacy right in Florida cases" and for the religious
freedom right on out-of-state blood transfusion cases.5
The District Court of Appeals recognized four state
41. Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679, 680 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987).
42. id. at 681.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 680.
46. Id. at 682-83.
47. Id. at 683.
48. Id. at 684.
49. Id at 687-88.
50. Id. at 684-86. The original case in the line of cases was Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So. 2d 160 (Ela. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). See also supra note
3.
51. Wons, 500 So. 2d at 686. The cases cited included In re Estate of Brooks, 32 III.
2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972); Mercy Hospital,
Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (Ct. Spec. App. 1985); In re Brown, 478
So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985).
[Vol. VII
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interests to be weighed against Mrs. Won's constitutional right
to refuse treatment. 2 First, the state had an interest in the
preservation of life." Second, the state protected innocent
third parties from injury,54 especially minor children who would
be abandoned." Third, the state had a duty to prevent
suicide. Finally, the state played a role in maintaining the
ethical integrity of the medical profession." Because the
constitutional rights to privacy and religious freedom were so
weighty in American constitutional tradition, the Florida
District Court of Appeals found that only the "most grave of
societal interests may overcome the right to refuse medical
treatment."58
Although four grave or compelling societal interests
existed, the Florida District Court of Appeals only applied one
to Mrs. Wons.59 The court accepted a concession by the
appellee hospital that three of the four interests were not
relevant to Mrs. Wons.' The court never explained explicitly
why it accepted the concession, but referred to a transfusion
case decided by another Florida District Court of Appeals."
The Wons court reviewed how the other district court of
appeals applied the four interests and in doing so implicitly
dismissed the three interests as irrelevant.
In reviewing St. Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey,62 the Wons
court found that although the state may have had an interest
in preserving life, a competent individual possessed an equally
52. Wons, 500 So. 2d at 684.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Id. at 688.
56. Id
57. Id.
58. Id. at 687.
59. Id. at 685-86 (the court applied only the state's interest in protecting minors).
60. id.
61. Id. (quoting St. Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985)).
62. St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
1990]
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strong interest in autonomously making decisions about his or
her life, especially when decisions were based on religious
scruples.63 Also, blood transfusion patients were not suicidal
because the court records plainly indicated that they did not
desire to die, ' but wanted to live without the transfusion if
God would allow them to live.' Finally, medical ethics were
not negatively impacted when a patient refused a transfusion
because the medical profession recognized a competent
patient's right to refuse treatment."
The Florida District Court of Appeals in Wons only
applied the state's interests in protecting innocent third
parties, especially minors.67 Mrs. Wons was the mother of two
children ages twelve and fourteen,' but the court decided that
the parent-child relationship alone did not outweigh the
mother's right to refuse treatment.' The court found that
even if Mrs. Wons died, her children would receive care from
her husband, mother, and brothers." The existence of an
extended family ensured that the children would not be
abandoned.7 In addition to the existence of the extended
family, the court also found that the children " will no doubt
cherish the memory of the courageous mother who ... stood
by her religious convictions.' Even in death, Mrs. Wons
would be an inspiration to her children and as such, would
continue to provide spiritual and moral support to her
children.73
The Florida Supreme Court approved of the Florida
63. Wons, 500 So. 2d at 685.
64. Id. at 686.
65. Id. at 681.
66. Id. at 686.
67. Id. at 688.
68. Id. at 681.
69. Id. at 688.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id
73. Id.
[Vol. VII
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District Court of Appeals decision. " The Florida Supreme
Court began its analysis by outlining the four factors that
would indicate that existence of a compelling state interest."
However, the Florida Supreme Court followed the lead of the
District Court of Appeals by applying only the state's interest
in innocent third parties." The Florida Supreme Court found
that the state's interest in protecting Mrs. Wons' children from
the absence of a mother did not override her constitutional
rights to privacy and religious freedomYn The court also
observed that although the existence of two parents is
important to the development of children,7' the preferrence
for a two parent family does not outweigh constitutional
rights.' The court failed to explain its thinking. The court
referred to what it characterized as a "well-reasoned" and
"eloquent" opinion by the Florida District Court of Appeals.'
However, nowhere did the Florida Supreme Court focus on
the district court of appeals discussion concerning the
abandonment of children. Instead, the Florida Supreme Court
referred to the "highly articulate opinion" of the court below
concerning the deeply rooted importance of freedom of
privacy and religion in American society.8' The Florida
Supreme Court neglected to clarify a standard to be met to
prove that the protection of innocent third parties requires
that medical treatment be administered.
Wons included a concurring opinion joined by Chief
Justice Ehrlich, who also joined the majority opinion of the
court.82 The concurring opinion was clearer than the majority
regarding what standard to apply in determining whether the
74. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
75. Id. at 97.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 97-98.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 98.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 98-102.
1990]
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interest in protecting third parties outweighed the rights of
privacy and religious freedom.' Absent abandonment, the
state had no compelling interest that overcame the right to
refuse treatment. ' In addition, the court held that the state's
interest in the preservation of life must be balanced against
the patient's quality of life.' Chief Justice Ehrlich, in his
concurring opinion, articulated that because Mrs. Wons did
not desire to die, the state's interest in the prevention of
suicide was not implicated.~' Also, the state's interest in the
ethical integrity of the medical profession was weak 7 and
"[g]iven the fundamental nature of the constitutional rights
involved, protection of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession alone could never override these rights."'
The dissent disputed the majority's application of the
state interest in the protection of innocent third parties.'
Justice Overton subjectively viewed abandonment in terms of
the actions of individual parents.' In this case "the state's
interest in preventing a mother with minor children from
abandoning them through death is sufficient justification for
ordering the blood transfusion."91 It was irrelevant that the
children would be cared by another parent or extended
family.' The dissent bolstered its thinking by accusing the
majority of expanding the right to refuse treatment beyond
what the Florida Supreme Court originally intended."
Originally, the terminal nature of an illness allowed the patient
83. Id.
84. Id. at 99.
85. Id. at 100.
86. id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 101.
89. Id. at 103-04.
90. Id. at 104.
91. Id. at 104.
92. id.
93. Id. at 103.
[Vol. VII
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to chose no treatmentY Mrs. Wons could recover if she
accepted the blood transfusion and therefore the abandonment
of these minor children through death would be totally
unnecessary.' The dissent feared that the majority would
allow a parent to choose death over parenthood, which was
distinguishable from circumstances where a parent faced
certain death and chose to allow death to occur naturally.*
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
RIGHT To DIE IN FLORIDA:
Perlmutter AND PROGENY
The Wons case culminated eleven years of development
of Florida right to die law.' In 1979, a Florida District Court
of Appeals in Satz v. Perlmutter' approved a petition by a
seventy-three year old gentleman suffering from Lou Gehrigs
disease to be disconnected from a mechanical respirator."
The patient was aware of his predicament and completely in
command of his abilities to make treatment decisions' °°
Without an extensive explanation concerning the origins or
nature of the privacy right to refuse medical treatment, the
Perlmutter court applied, for the first time in such a context
in Florida, the four state interests' subsequently applied in
Wons. The court identified these interests as the preservation
of life, protection of innocent third parties, prevention of
suicide, and the preservation of the integrity of the medical
profession. 2 The court acknowledged that the state had an
interest in preserving life, but the strength of that interest
94. Id. at 104.
95. Id. at 105.
96. See supra note 3.
97. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97.
98. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. C1. App. 1978), affid, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 161.
101. Id. at 162.
102. Id.
1990]
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depended on the circumstances of the life involved. 3 The
court distinguished between curable and incurable diseases,
and found that the state interest failed to be compelling where
the disease was incurable."°
The Perlmutter court refused to find that the three
remaining state interests outweighed the patient's right to
choose not to be assisted by a ventilator."t The protection of
third parties was not relevant to the case because not only
were all the patient's children adults, but they agreed with his
decision." The court found that the patient was not
committing suicide even though his decision probably would
have resulted in his death.t 7 The court concluded that the
patient wanted to live, but without a mechanical breathing
device,"° and that he did not self-induce the disease."° Also,
the court preceived little difference between declining
treatment at diagnosis and discontinuing treatment after
diagnosis."' Hence, a mortally ill patient could not be forced
to undergo surgery and could decide to end a therapy already
underway. The refusal of original treatment was a passive
choice, while the decision to end therapy already underway as
an active choice failed to concern the court."' The Perlmutter
court also recognized that there was no conflict between the
professional commitment of the medical profession to heal and
the deadly role that medical professionals would play in
disconnecting a patient from a ventilator."2
Perhnutter firmly established the right to withdraw
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 162-63.
106. Id. at 162.
107. Id. at 163.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. "[Tlhe prevaling ethical practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are more
often in need of comfort than treatment." Id.
[Vol. VII
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treatment even when death was likely."' However, the Florida
District Court of Appeals limited the right to the
circumstances of Perlmutter involving a competent adult."'
Questions existed concerning whether the right to withdraw
treatment extended beyond a competent elderly adult suffering
from an incurable, terminal disease."5 The Florida District
Court of Appeals in Perlmutter specifically acknowledged that
its holding did not necessarily apply to an incompetent
patient."6 Within a few years after Perlmutter, the Florida
courts were faced with questions concerning how far to extend
Permutter. 7
John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth"8 involved many of
the same circumstances as Perlmutter, but the patient in
Bludworth had suffered permanent brain damage."9 At the
time when the patient was placed on a mechanical ventilator,
he was suffering from acute respiratory failure, chronic
interstitial fibrosis, and gastrointestinal bleeding. The
patient's condition had been diagnosed as terminal.' The
Florida Supreme Court held that terminally ill incompetent
persons possessed the same right as competent persons to
have treatment withdrawn where such persons were kept alive
by "extraordinary artifica! means" and were at the threshold of
death. 2  The court focused on the artificiality of the methods
used to extend life and distinguished between the continuation
of life and the prolongation of the dying process." As a
result, the court developed a "sliding scale" analysis of state
113. Id. at 164.
114. Id. at 162.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 370 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1984).
118. 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984), quashing 432 So. 2d 611 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
119. John F. Kennedy Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 922 (1984).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 923.
123. Id.
1990]
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interests for the terminally ill patient.'24 The state's interests
preventing the termination of life weakened as the patient's
prognosis worsened and the bodily invasion involved in
treatment became greater."z The court stated, "[t]he issue in
these cases is not whether a life should be saved ... it is how
long and at what expense the dying process should be
prolonged."'" Bludworth left little doubt that an adult patient,
competent or incompetent, suffering from an incurable,
terminal disease facing imminent death may be withdrawn
from treatment. 7
Perlmutter and Bludworth involved adult patients.
Neither case discussed whether the right to withdraw
treatment resulting in almost certain death would apply to a
child. In re Guardianship of Bany," a child was born with a
syndrome that caused the destruction of most of the child's
brain.29 Within two days of birth, the child was placed on a
ventilator in a permanent vegetative state.' With the
ventilator, the child's life expectancy was approximately two
years, and without the ventilator, his life expectancy was no
more that two hours.' The Bany court followed the Florida
District Court of Appeals in Bludworth, holding that an
incompetent patient, even a child, had the same rights as a
competent patient to have treatment withdrawn."' The court
found that the state interest in preserving and prolonging life
was overriden where a patient was terminally ill with an
incurable and irreversible condition.'33  The Bany court
expanded on the analysis Perlmutter and Bludworth by also
124. Id.
125. Id. at 924.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 926.
128. 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
129. Id. at 370.
130. Id. at 3168.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 370.
133. Id. at 371.
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focusing on the hopelessness of meaningful life for the child
due to the lack of cognitive brain function, lack of awareness
of surroundings, and hopelessness for developing such
awareness. 3m The court expanded the right to withdraw
treatment from children suffering both permanent, incurable,
and irreversible physical and mental defects when death was
likely.'35
Perlmutter, Bludworth, and Barry allowed for death with
dignity for both competent and incompetent patients, even
minors. In all three cases, patients were spared death by
ventilators."3 The courts in the three cases viewed the
mechanical devices as "extraordinary" or "artificial" measures,
treatments or methods.'37 What constituted such measures,
treatments or methods was not certain and whether nutrition
would be considered such a withdrawable method was also not
mentioned."3 In Corbett v. D' Alessandro,39 the patient's
condition was similar to that of the patient in Bludworth. In
Corbett, the patient languished in a persistant vegetative state
for two years until her husband petitioned for withdrawl of life
sustaining treatment. " No reasonable prospect for regaining
cognitive brain function existed."' The court never questioned
whether the right to withdraw treatment existed, but did tackle
the question of whether nutritional sustenance constituted a
withdrawable extraordinary life prolonging procedure.'42 The
court refused to differentiate artificial feeding devices such as
134. Id.
135. Id. at 372.
136. Id. See also John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923
(Fla. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
137. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 924.
138. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Bludworth, 452 So. 2d at 922; Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d at 162.
139. Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
140. Id. at 369.
141. Id. at 370.
142. Id. at 370-72. Nutritional sustenance is a life prolonging nutrition artificially
supplied through a nasogastric tube. Id.
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nasogastric tubes from other procedures such as ventilators.'43
Instead, the court focused on the word "sustain" as it was used
by the Bludworth court.'" The Corbett court found no
difference between sustenance with food or other medical
procedures.'45 When a patient was vegetative and comatose
and faced imminent death, any method of life prolongation
was artificial.'" Hence, a patient possessed a right to
withdrawal of treatment, even feeding, where the treatment
accomplished only the continuation of a vegetative and
comatose state in the face of imminent death.
From Perlmutter to Corbett, the Florida courts
consistently applied a right to choose death where a patient's
condition proved hopeless and death was inevitable.'47 In such
circumstances, treatment could be withdrawn as a matter of
right if death was imminent.'" A year before the Corbett
decision, a Florida District Court of Appeals in St. Mary's
Hospital v. Ramsey49 applied the right to refuse treatment
when the prognosis for recovery was positive. In Ramsey, the
patient was twenty-seven years old, suffered from kidney
disease, and required the regular use of renal dialysis. During
the treatment process, the patient needed a blood transfusion
and refused the transfusion on religious grounds.' If he had
accepted the transfusion, his continued use of renal dialysis'
would have assured a "not unreasonably short" life
expectancy.' 2 Without distinguishing the circumstances of
Perlmutter and Bludworth, the Ramsey court applied the four
143. Id. at 371.
144. Id. at 370-71.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 371.
148. Id.
149. 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
150. Id. at 667-68.
151. Id. at 667.
152. Id.
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state interests recognized by the Perlmutter court."3
• The Ramsey court found that a patient may choose to
refuse treatment as long as no overriding reason to preserve
life existed.'54 The right to refuse treatment was a basic right
"whether his refusal to do so arises from fear of adverse
reaction, religious belief, recalcitrance or cost."'55 The court
viewed the state interest in preservation of life in terms of self
determination.'56 So long as an adult possessed a right to
determine questions about his or her life, the state's interest
in preservation of life could not outweigh. the right to choose
treatment. The court applied the state interest in protecting
innocent third parties without extensive discussion even though
the patient was the father of a minor child.'57 The court found
no abandonment because the child lived with her mother in
another state and would be the beneficiary of a small annuity
if her father died.'58 Also, the court stated that the mother
and extended family would provide support to the child. "9
The court found that the patient wished to live and did not
self-induce his malady, and therefore the state interest in the
prevention of suicide was not implicated." Finally, the refusal
to accept a blood transfusion did not undermine medical
ethics because the medical profession was obligated to
acquiesce to the treatment decisions of patients. 6'
Ramsey added new dimensions to the right to refuse or
withdraw treatment that developed in Permutter, Bludworth,
Bany, and Corbett. Leaping from patients in extremis to
patients who could survive, the Ramsey court failed to explain
the broader application of the right to refuse treatment.
153. Id. at 668-69.
154. Id. at 668.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 669.
161. Id.
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Additionally the Florida Supreme Court in Public Health Trust
of Dade County v. Wons appeared to have acquiesed to that
leap without explanation.62 The Wons court cited to Ramsey
and a number of out-of-state cases without explaining the
rationale behind expanding the Perlmutter privacy right to
patients with positive chances for survival.'"
In Florida a patient even with minor children possessed
the right to refuse treatment, but what was troubling was that
the Florida courts failed to rationalize why that right existed.
In Perlmutter, the Florida District Court of Appeals pointed to
out of state law as the basis of its decision." Possibly, a re-
examination of that and other out of state law will help to
understand why in Ramsey and Wons, the Florida courts
expanded the right to choose a likelihood of death.
V. FLORIDA RIGHT To DIE LAW
AFTER Wons: In Re Browning
In 1989, after Wons was decided, a Florida District
Court of Appeals in In Re Browningt" upheld a legal
guardian's authority to decide whether to withdraw treatment
from a patient." In Browning, the patient was an eighty-eight
year old victim of a massive stroke that had created major,
permanent, and irreversible brain damage.67 Because the
patient was unable to swallow, she was fed through a
nasogastric tube" which the guardian desired to be
withdrawn.'" Though damage to the patient's brain was
catastrophic and irreversible, uncertainty existed about her
162. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97-98 (1989).
163. Id.
164. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
165. 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
166. Id. at 261.
167. Id.
168. Id at 262.
169. Id.
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condition.7 ' While one physician characterized her condition
as a persistent vegetative state with limited neurological
activity above the brain stem, another physician described the
patient as alert enough to follow people with her eyes.' A
nurse heard the patient mumble words on occasion."
The court focused on fashioning a remedy for a less
than competent patient to vindicate the right to choose
whether to continue treatment.' The court decided that a
surrogate decision maker could utilize an informal forum to
make such a decision.1 7' The guardian is required to weigh a
number of factors including the patient's condition, the
probability of regaining consciousness, the clarity of the
patient's wishes, and the state interests discussed in
Perlmutter.175 A decision to withdraw treatment may only occur
when clear and convincing evidence of what the patient's
desires would be if the patient were competent to make a
decision exists. 76
In fashioning the remedial procedure, the court in
Browning focused on a number of doctrinal issues. First, the
court rejected the use of dichotomies to distinguish between
medical conditions. 77 Terminal as opposed to non-terminal
diseases or imminence of death as opposed to probability of
continued life proved unhelpful for making withdrawal
decisions. Instead the court adopted a multifactor balancing
test that allowed for "a more complete and descriptive analysis
of the patient's physical condition."'7 8 Second, the Browning
Court discussed the state interests or factors utilized by the
170. Id. at 261-62.
171. Id. at 263.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 267.
174. The court failed to adequately define the nature of an informal forum, though
health care facility bioethical committees were mentioned. Id. at 269 n.16.
175. Id. at 271.
176. Id. at 272-73
177. Id. at 271-72.
178. Id. at 271.
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Florida courts beginning with Perlmuuer and including Wons.'"
The Browning court characterized the state interests as both
interests and factors, finding that the factors were not
exclusive." The court recognized that the four factors
overlapped each other and that a longer, more precise list of
factors could be defined."8 '
The court also recognized quality of life as a
consideration in deciding whether to withdraw treatment.'8
However, the court found that when quality of life was a
consideration, the four state interests or factors became
weightier in a decision."8 The state interest in protecting life
sharply increases because a decision to withdraw treatment
based on quality of life considerations comes closer to
suicide."t The state interest in the ethics of the medical
profession also becomes weighter when quality of life issues
are involved, because the personal values of medical
practitioners may forbid them from participating in treatment
withdrawal."u
Before it is possible to examine the implications of
Wons and Browning on future Florida right to die law, the
out-of-state doctrinal bases for the Florida law needs to be
examined along with other out-of-state law that could clarify
and strengthen the right to die in Florida.
179, Id. at 269.
180. Id. at 266.
181. Id. at n.ll.
182. Id. at 270.
183. Id.
184. Id at 269-70.
185. "While the state cannot allow the ethics of physicians or nurses to override the
constitutional rights of patients, they are a legitimate concern which should not be lightly
disregarded." Id. at 270.
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VI. THE DocnuiAL BASIS FOR THE FLORIDA
RIGrr To DiE: MASSACHUSE'rs
AND NEW JERSEY PRivACY LAW
The Florida courts based the law protecting the right
to refuse or withdraw life saving or life extending treatment on
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,'" a
1977 Massachusetts case. The Perlmutter court began its
analysis with and consistently relied on Saikewicz.'" Not only
did the Perlmutter court adopt the four state interests used in
Saikewicz, but the Florida District Court of Appeals that
decided Perlmutter explicitly agreed with Saikewicz.1" The
Perlmutter court stated, "we adopt the view of the line of cases
discussed in Saikewicz . . . ."' Even when the Perlmutter court
stated that "we find, and agree with, several cases upholding
the right of a competent adult patient to refuse treatment for
himself,""' the court first cited to Saikewicz and then to cases
from a number of other states. 9 ' References to Saikewicz
appeared throughout Perlmutter. The Florida cases that
followed Perlmutter continued to refer to Saikewicz.'" In
order to understand the holdings and doctrine of Perlmutter
and the Florida right to die cases that followed Perlmutter, an
understanding of Saikewicz and subsequent Massachusetts
privacy law is necessary.
186. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
187. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 163.
191. Id. at n.3. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In the Matter of Schiller, 148 NJ. Super. 168, 372 A.2d
360 (1977); In the Matter of Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d 974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1976);
In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. Ct. App.
1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44
Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (1962). See also Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
192. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (1984) and
Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 100 (Erhlich, C.J., concurring).
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A. Saikewicz and the Right to
Withdraw Treatment in Massachusetts
The Massachusetts courts in Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz1 ' faced immediately the issue of
withholding treatment from an incompetent patient."
Saikewicz contrasted with Perlmutter, the first Florida
withdrawal of treatment case, because Perlmutter involved a
competent adult patient and Saikewicz involved an
incompetent adult. Unlike the Florida courts which postponed
deciding whether the right to choose treatment extended to an
incompetent patient, the Saikewicz court immediately held that
the right to decline treatment applied equally to competent
and incompetent patients alike.' The patient in Saikewicz
suffered from leukemia, an incurable desease at that time."9
The disease was invariably fatal and for the fifty percent of
the cases in which remission could be induced, remission
lasted between two and thirteen -months.1" If the disease
remained untreated, death would result in a matter of weeks
or months." The patient in Saikewicz was a sixty-seven year
old profoundly retarded individual who had resided in a state
hospital for almost forty years.'" The proposed chemotherapy
treatment would have entailed severe side effects and would
have required the cooperation of the patient, which was
impossible here due to his incompetency.'
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided the
issue in the narrow context of life prolonging rather than life
saving treatment. 201 Though the court never explicitly
193. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d at 417.
194. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
197. Id. at 732, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
198. Id. at 733, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
199. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
200. Id. at 734, 370 N.E.2d at 421.
201. Id. at 735, 370 N.E.2d at 422.
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distinguished life saving treatment from life prolonging
treatment, the court provided indications of differences
between treatment types. The court discussed life
prolongation as new techniques, extraordinary measures, and
advances in medical science that allowed for greater control
over dying.' z The new extraordinary techniques prolonged life
thereby prolonging suffering for the patients and the patient's
family.'0 3 Discussing life saving and life prolonging modalities,
the court started its analysis with whether a right to withhold
treatment existed.' The court based its discussion on a
distinction between allowing the natural course of disease and
death to progress and causing death.' The court failed to
provide examples of each type of treatment and conceded
that the distinction was subtle.' The court also found that
medical ethics allowed withholding treatment where no hope
of recovery existed and recovery was defined as life without
intolerable suffering."
The Saikewicz court recognized two doctrinal bases for
the right to withdraw or withhold treatment. First, the
common law right to privacy accorded an individual "a strong
interest in being free from nonconsensual invasion of his
bodily integrity."' Second, the federal constitutional right to
privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut 20 and Roe v.
202. Id. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
203. Id. at 737-38, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
204. Id. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423. The discussion involved medical ethics and the
terminally ill. Id.
205. Sometimes a lack of treatment resulted in death occuring naturally, while at other
times no treatment was tantamount to killing the patient. Id. at 738, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
206. Id.
207. Presumably, the natural course of death should be allowed to progress where
intolerable suffering existed. Id.
208. Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
209. A good example of common law protection was the doctrine of informed consent.
Id. The individual was deemed to possess control over his or her person, thereby assuring
protection of his or her status as a human being. Capron, Informed Consent on Catastrophic
Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 366-67 (1984).
210. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1990]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Wade21' protected individual dignity and self-determination. 1 '
The federal constitutional right "encompasses the right of a
patient to preserve his or her right to privacy against
unwanted infringements of bodily integrity ....""'
After reviewing the bases for the right to withdraw or
withhold treatment, the Saikewicz court recognized that the
combined common law and constitutional right to bodily
privacy could be outweighed by public or state interests."'
The court reviewed how other state courts weighed public
interests against the right to bodily privacy. A number of
cases existed where no state interests were recognized and the
right to privacy was accorded a very strong weight."5
However, in reviewing such cases, the Saikewicz court
parenthetically noted that even those cases recognized public
health, safety, and morals interests. 16 In fact, the Saikewicz
court found a number of cases which recognized state interests
such as preventing suicide, protecting minors, the medical
profession's commitment to saving life, preserving life, and
hospitals' commitments to fully caring for patients in their
custody and control."1 7
In light of its review of out-of-state cases, the Saikewicz
court implied that the state interest in the preservation of life
was not uniformly strong in all cases. 18 The state interest
might have been strong when a disease was curable, but much
weaker when treatment resulted in a brief extension of life.219
In Saikewicz, the state interest in life was counterbalanced by
the strong physical and emotional burdens placed on the
211. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
212. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
213. Id. at 740, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (citing In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-39, 355 A.2d
647, 662-64 (1976)).
214. See id. at 740-45, 370 N.E.2d at 424-27.
215. Id. at 740, 370 N.E.2d at 424-25.
216. Id. at 370 N.E.2d at 425.
217. Id. at 740-41, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
218. Id. at 740-41, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
219. Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
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patient.' In addition, the Saikewicz court referred vaguely to
the state interest in protecting other parties because the
patient in Saikewicz had no minor children. The court talked
in general terms about the need to prevent abandonment by
parents, but never defined abandonment precisely."1 Also, the
court declined to extensively discuss the state interest in
preventing suicide because this interest was inapplicable to
the case. 2  Last, the court was consistent when it discussed
the state interest in preserving medical ethics. The court
opened its analysis of the case by reviewing the relationship
between contemporary medical ethics and treatment for the
terminally ill.' In its discussion, the court observed that
modern medicine often provided the dying with comfort rather
than treatment. 224  The dichotomy between comfort and
treatment fits well with prior dichotomies between curable
and incurable diseases and life prolongation and lifesaving
treatments.
Saikewicz established a right to withdraw from or forego
treatment involving an incurable disease that invariably
resulted in death.' In such circumstances, treatment was
considered useless, prolonging suffering. Inevitable death
should be allowed to occur. The right to refuse treatment and
risk inevitable death was a combined common law and
constitutional right. A number of Massachusetts cases
followed Saikewicz.' To understand how Florida law after
Perlmutter developed in the light of Saikewicz, it will be helpful
to review the development of Massachusetts law after
220. Id. at 744, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
221. Id. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426.
222. Id. at 743 n.ll, 744, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.ll, 427.
223. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
224. Id. at 743, 370 N.E. 2d at 426.
225. Id. at 745, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
226. Matter of Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 475-76, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135 (Mass.
App. 1978), superceded by In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. at 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 at 634 (1986); Littleton v. Poitrast,
No. 85-7 (Mass. Jan. 21, 1985).
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Saikewicz.
B. Massachusetts Law after Saikewicz
The case law following Saikewicz reflected not only
clarification of the basic doctrine developed in Saikewicz, but
also confusion and inconsistency in the application of
Saikewicz. First, the Massachusetts courts consistently have
allowed patients to withdraw or be withdrawn from treatment
even where death was neither imminent nor certain within
the forseeable future." The Massachusetts courts failed to
explain why the imminence of death was not required as
Florida first required.' One likely reason that imminence of
death was not required was a recognition that modern medical
technical technology created a hybrid existence in which death
has begun but life continues.' A hybrid existence could
continue for years, sometimes for decades, especially when
mechanical devices provided basic functions for the body.'
The Massachusetts courts avoided focusing on treatment
types or the rationale of patients for refusing treatment.
Distinctions between types of therapies were not made.
Nutrition was considered the same as any other medical
treatment." In addition, patients were allowed to refuse
treatment for wise or unwise reasons."2 The courts avoided
judging the rationale for a medical care decision unless the
rationale touched on public safety." So long as a patient was
minimally competent to be informed concerning the
consequences of no treatment, the wisdom of the decision was
227. See, e.g., Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. at 475-76, 380 N.E.2d at 135.
228. Id.
229. Brophy, 398 Mass. at 419-20, 497 N.E.2d at 627.
230. Id. at 437, 497 N.E.2d at 637.
231. See generally Brophy, 398 Mass. at 417, 497 N.E.2d at 626; Matter of Hier, 18 Mass.
App. Ct. 200 207, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1984), rev denied, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261
(1984).
232. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 383, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978).
233. See Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979).
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not relevent,l though the objective circumstances of the
disease and treatment were relevent to whether the patient
had a right to refuse treatment.25
Although the Massachusetts courts consistently applied
the four state interests fashioned in Saikewicz,' the courts
struggled with defining and according weight to those interests.
In fact, within two years of Saikewicz, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court identified a fifth state interest, the
maintenance of orderly and secure prisons, which was
balanced against a prison inmates' right to refuse
hemodialysis. 7 By identifying an additional state interest, the
court implied that the four state interests identified in
Saikewicz were neither all inconclusive nor established
permanently for all future cases. Apparently, the
Massachusetts courts were free to identify new state interests
and apply appropriate state interests flexibly where new
circumstances required.
As the courts recognized a new state interest, the
original interests were further developed. The Massachusetts
courts dealt with the interest in preserving the integrity of the
medical profession on an uneasy basis.' On one hand, the
courts applied a "sliding scale" to medical ethics and
withdrawal of treatment. 9  When a patient faced certain
death, medical ethics did not require life-saving treatments, but
where the prognosis was positive and the treatment non-
invasive, medical ethics required treatment even where "such
'reasonable force' as is necessary is used" to administer
treatment. 240 Hence, the state possesses a strong enough
234. Lane, 6 Mass. App. at 383, 376 N.E.2d at 1236.
235. Id. at 378-79 n.2, 376 N.E.2d at 1233 n.3.
236. See Myers, 379 Mass. at 255, 399 N.E.2d at 452; In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 621
(Mass. 1986).
237. Myers, 379 Mass. at 264, 399 N.E.2d at 457.
238. Id. at 265, 399 N.E.2d at 458; Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439-41, 497 N.E.2d at 638-39.
239. See Myers, 379 Mass. at 255, 399 N.E.2d at 452.
240. Id. at 263, 265, 399 N.E.2d at 457.
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interest in the ethics of the medical professional to require a
patient whose disease is curable to complete treatment
especially where the treatment is relatively non-invasive. On
the other hand, the patient's right to control his or her own
body was so strong that the right almost always outweighed
medical "institutional considerations."2 ' As a result, the state
interest in medical ethics was not a controlling interest in
deciding whether to allow a patient to refuse treatment,
though medical ethics could be one factor among a number to
weigh against allowing a patient to refuse treatment.242
Medical ethics could require treatment, but rarely would
the individual's right to self-determination cede to the ethical
requirements of physicians and hospitals. Although courts
were concerned about medical ethics, they prioritized
individual decision-making.243 The balance favoring patients
encouraged a compromise with the ethical needs of medical
professionals and institutions. Courts were faced with
phyicians who refused to participate in a patient's legally
protected decision to refuse treatment,4 and the
Massachusetts courts refused to require the physicians to
participate so long as alternative medical resources that would
cooperate with the patient existed.145 Physicians and hospitals
would not be required to allow a patient to die so long as the
patient could be transferred to the care of other medical
professionals.2'
The Massachusetts courts refused to view a patient who
refused treatment as committing suicide.247 There are three
rationales for the courts distinction for why suicide did not
exist.2" First, the courts dichotomized the cause of death by
241. Id. at 265, 399 N.E.2d at 458.
242. Id.
243. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
244. Id. at 429, 497 N.E.2d at 639.
245. Id. at 441, 497 N.E.2d at 639.
246. id.
247. Id. at 439, 497 N.E.2d at 638.
248. Id.
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distinguishing between discontinuation or refusal of treatment
as the agent of death and the disease as the cause of death.249
In treatment withdrawal circumstances, the lack of treatment
allowed nature to take its course.' The patient succumbed
to the disease and not the lack of treatment. Second, natural
causes would be the reason for death even where a patient
refusing treatment could be restored to a relatively normal,
healthy life. "  Suicide failed to exist because the patient
lacked "the specific intent" to cause his or her own death, 2
because the patient wished not to die but to live without
treatment, or to accomplish some other goal by refusing
treatment. " Last, the courts refused to judge the motives of
the patient and found that an informed patient could refuse
treatment for any reason, "wise or unwise." "  It was not
relevant that the patient's motives were less than pure.
The state interest posing the greatest difficulties for the
Massachusetts courts was the protection of life.2 " The courts
developed two ways to apply that interest.2" First, the courts
created dichotomies similar to those utilized in applying the
state interest in preventing suicide.2 " The Saikewicz court
originally distinguished between life prolonging and life saving
treatment.2"8  After Saikewicz, the courts applied such
dichotomies in gauging the strength of the state interest in
protecting life. Not only did the courts recognize a life
prolonging as opposed to life saving dichotomy, but also
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass 255, 258-59, 399 N.E.2d 452,
454 (1979).
252. Id. at 262, 399 N.E.2d at 459.
253. Id. at 259, 399 N.E.2d at 454.
254. Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. 377, 383, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (1978).
255. Myers, 379 Mass. at 262, 399 N.E.2d at 456.
256. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986);
Myers, 379 Mass. at 255, 399 N.E.2d at 452.
257. See supra notes 246 to 253 and accompanying text.
258. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 736-
38, 370 N.E.2d 417, 422-24 (1977).
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curable as opposed to incurable dichotomy29 and extraordinary
cure as opposed to ordinary cure dichotomy.' However, the
dichotomies failed to serve their purpose. To find that the
state interest in protecting life outweighed the patient's right
to refuse treatment where the disease was curable as opposed
to where it was incurable proved unhelpful and confusing.
A prime example of the confusion caused by
dichotomizing occured in Matter of DinnersteinN" In response
to the Saikewicz requirement of a court order to withhold life
prolonging treatment to an incompetent dying patient, 2 many
physicians feared placing a no resuscitation order on a
terminally ill patient's chart without a court order. The
physicians feared that resuscitation was considered a life
prolonging treatment.' The Dinnerstein court observed that
the Saikewicz court never intended to distinguish between life
prolonging and life saving, and that both terms meant
"effecting a permanent or temporary cure."'  Hence,
physicians could enter a "no code" order without a court order
where no likelihood of improvement in health conditions
existed.' Generally, the use of dichotomies proved unhelpful
to the courts' and another method of deciding when the state
interest in protecting life outweighed the right to refuse
treatment had to be developed.
Instead of applying dichotomies to gauge the strength
of the state interest in life, the Massachusetts courts
developed a sliding scale for balancing state interests against
259. See Brophy, 398 Mass. at 433, 497 N.E.2d at 635.
260. Id. at 437, 497 N.E.2d at 637.
261. Matter of Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) superceded by In
re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
262. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 755-59, 370 N.E.2d at 432-35.
263. Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. at 469-71, 380 N.E.2d at 136-37.
264. Id. at 472, 380 N.E.2d at 138.
265. Id. at 474-76, 380 N.E.2d at 138-39. A "no code" order entered in a patient's
medical record instructs the medical staff not to summon the code team in the event of a
cardiac or respiratory arrest. Id. at 472, 380 N.E.2d at 136.
266. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 437-38, 497 N.E.2d 626, 637-
38 (1986).
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individual rights. 7  The state interest in protecting life
strengthened and the individual's right to refuse treatment
weakened when medical conditions and treatments had
different impacts on patients.' A number of impacts were
identified. The greater the magnitude of the invasiveness of
treatment, the weaker the state interest became, especially
where the prognosis was poor.' Hemodialysis"'7 or surgery
such as a gastrostomy7' were considered invasive procedures
and burdensome to the patient2' while the oral or intravenous
administration of drugs were considered non-invasive
treatments.2" Overall, the state interest in preserving life
strengthened where the disease posed no threat to life and a
positive prognosis existed.74 At the end of the continuum
favoring state interests was a normal, functioning, existence,'
and favoring the right to refuse treatment was the patient
nearing the end of a normal life span with incapacitating
afflictions and treatment prolonging suffering.Y Omitted from
the sliding scale were quality of life questions.2" The state
interest failed to weaken as a patient's quality of life
worsened. Instead, the courts focused on likelihood of
recovery and the traumatic nature of the treatments
involved."78
A sliding scale approach to balancing state interests,
267. Id. at 437, 497 N.E. 2d at 637.
268. Id at 437-38, 497 N.E.2d at 637-38.
269. In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 640, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122-23 (1980).
270. Id. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at 122-23.
271. Matter of Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 208, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1984), appeal-
deniid, 392 Mass. 1102, 465 N.E.2d 261 (1984).
272. See also Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 378-79, 376 N.E.2d 1232-33 n.2
(1978).
273. Spring, 380 Mass. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at 122-23.
274. Id. at 641, 405 N.E.2d at 123.
275. See Matter of Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 473, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1978).
276. Matter of Hier, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 206, 464 N.E.2d 959, 965 (1984).
277. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635
(1986).
278. Id.
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especially the interest in preserving life against individual
rights, seemed reasonable. State interests were not static, and
a state may have possessed a greater interest in preserving life
in certain circumstances than in other circumstances. 27
However, the Massachusetts courts were inconsistent in
applying the sliding scale approach.' The right to refuse
treatment was accorded where the trial judge found that the
refusal of treatment would lead to "the needless loss of human
life that could be saved." 1
The patient in Littleton v. Poitrast' suffered from
severe internal bleeding of unknown origins and consented to
testing and surgery but not to blood transfusions because she
was a Jehovah's Witness.' The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court justice who wrote the memorandum of decision
did not counter the trial judge's finding that a "[b]lood
transfusion is relatively painless, safe and minimally intensive
with a high degree of success in treating cases.' Yet, the
lack of intrusiveness of the treatment and the positive
prognosis for the patient appeared to play no role in the
justice's decision to allow the patient to refuse treatment. The
justice failed to provide fully rationales for his decision, but
seemed to focus on the existence of a competent, informed
individual making a rational decision on religious bases.
Certainly, Littleton was not decided on the basis that the
patient was competent, because Saikewicz originally held that
the rights of competent and incompetent patients remained
279. See, e.g., Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 266-67, 399
N.E.2d 452, 456 (1979). "'here is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human
life be saved where the affliction of curable, as opposed to the State interest where ... the
issue is not whether, but when, for how long, and at what cost to the individual that life may
be briefly extended."
280. Id. at 285, 399 N.E.2d at 452. See also Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
281. Littleton v. Poitrast, No. 85-7 (Mass. Jan. 21, 1985) (Lexis, States library, Mass.
file).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
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the same.' Possibly, Littleton applied an individual rights
weighted definition of the state interest in protecting life. The
state's interest in protecting life was viewed as more than just
prolonging "mere corporeal existence. '
The state protected life in which the individual has -a
"right to protect his humanity." ' The interest of the state
in preserving life also included the right of the individual to
avoid efforts to sustain life that demeaned and degraded
individual dignity and a sense of humanity.' However,
quality of life did not constitute part of this individual rights
weighted view of the state interest in life because the courts
refrained from pronouncing judgment on whether life was
worth living. Instead, the courts focused on allowing
individuals to choose to die with dignity' or at least live in a
dignified manner. Littleton included a human dignity
component as part of the state interest in preserving life.'9
The patient in Littleton was allowed to decide for herself what
treatments compromised her sense of personhood and
dignity. 9' If the approach of Littleton involved such a human
dignity component, the weighting of the sliding scale approach
was questionable. The state might have claimed a strong
interest in the patient accepting treatment when the prognosis
was positive and the treatment relatively non-intrusive, but the
right to self-determination continued to weigh heavily toward
the right to choose by the individual.
Not only was the Florida right to die law based on out-
of-state law, especially Saikewitz, but Saikewitz and subsequent
285. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 745, 370
N.E.2d 417, 427 (1977).
286. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 434, 497 N.E.2d 626, 635
(1986).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Littleton v. Poitrast, No. 85-7 (Mass. Jan. 21, 1985) (Lexis, States library, Mass.
file).
291. Id.
1990]
74 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Massachusetts law also relied on out-of-state law.
C. Quinlan and New Jersey Right to Die Law
The Florida right to die law relied on Saikewicz for its
basis, however the court in Saikewicz relied on Matter of
Quinlan' which was based on federal constitutional law.'
In Quinlan, a twenty-two year old patient"' remained in a
chronic, persistant vegetative state lacking cognitive function
and required a respirator to aid breathing.' Treatment would
have neither cured nor improved the patient's condition and,
at the time of the appeal, the patient's probable lifespan was
no more than one year.' The patient's father advanced three
legal arguments in support of disconnecting the patient from
the respirator.' First, he asserted that the federal
constitutionally protected right to free exercise of religion'
allowed him, as a practicing Catholic, to follow his conscience
and require physicians to withdraw life support from his
daughter.' The court found that the free exercise clause
failed to protect the withdrawal of treatment because
withdrawal of treatment constituted conduct and not protected
belief.' The government could have controlled religious
conduct such as requiring religiously prohibited vaccinations or
forbidding rituals such as snake handling."' The state's
interest in preserving life overcame ambiguous beliefs of a
292. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739-
40, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert denied
sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
293. Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 35-36, 355 A.2d at 661-62.
294. Quinlan, 70 NJ. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
295. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at 655.
296. Id. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655.
297. Id. at 34-42, 355 A.2d at 660-64.
298. Id. at 35, 355 A.2d at 661.
299. Id. at 29-34, 355 A.2d at 657-60.
300. Id. at 35-36, 355 A.2d at 661-62.
301. Id at 35-36, 355 A.2d at 661.
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religion concerning withdrawal from extraordinary life
prolonging treatment.'
The second legal argument asserted by the patient's
father was that continued treatment constituted cruel and
unusual punishment of the patient.' The court determined
that cruel and unusual treatment was irrelevant to the
patient's circumstances because the patient was not imprisoned
by state authorities.' "Neither the State, nor the law, but the
accident of fate and nature, has inflicted upon her conditions
which though in essence cruel and most unusual, yet do not
amount to 'punishment' in any constitutional sense."'
The court accepted the third legal argument advanced
by the patient's father , that a right of privacy protected the
choice to accept or reject treatment.' Unlike the
Massachusetts court in Saikewicz which based its decision on
both common and constitutional bases, the Quinlan court
based its decision solely on federal constitutional doctrine,'
referring obliquely to the New Jersey Constitution.' The
Quinlan court utilized the protections of personal choices
relating to child bearing and family life recognized in Griswold
v. Connecticut' and Roe v. Wade"' to hold "[p]resumably
this right is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to
decline medical treatment under certain circumstances.... 1
The Quinlan court also recognized that the state
302. Id. at 35-37, 355 A.2d at 661.
303. Id. at 37, 355 A.2d at 662.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 38, 355 A.2d at 662.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 39-40, 355 A.2d at 662-63.
308. Id. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663. See also N.J. CoNsT. art. I, § 1. (1947).
309. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1%5). The United States Supreme Court
held that there was a fundamental right to privacy in "the private realm of family life." Id.
at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
310. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a person's right to privacy,
encompassed in the 14th Amendment's concept of personal liberty, is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy).
311. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
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interests in the preservation and sanctity of human life and the
role of the physician in administering medical treatment had
to be balanced against the patient's privacy right.312
However, in Quinlan, the right to privacy strongly outweighed
the state interests.313 The court applied a sliding scale test to
the weight to be assigned to the state interests similar to that
used by the Massachusetts courts,314 using the degree of bodily
invasion involved in treatment and the prognosis for recovery
by the patient.315 The state interests weakened and the right
to privacy strengthened as bodily invasion increased and
prognosis worsened.316 For instance, no state interest could
compel a patient to remain in an irreversable vegetative
state.3 7  The court could have ended its discussions of state
interests at that point, but opted to discuss treatment
withdrawal in relation to medical ethics. 38 The court indicated
that medical professionals would be faced with troubling
questions concerning what circumstances were appropriate for
ordering an end to treatment. 39 The court recognized that
although professional independence had to be respected,3 °
physicians needed guidelines for making decisions that would
result in the death of patients.31' The court recommended
the creation of medical ethics committees at hospitals to
screen the appropriateness of treatment withdrawal decisions. ,z
The New Jersey cases that followed Quinlan strengthened
the right to refuse treatment and to die and clarified the
312. Id. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
313. Id.
314. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 433-39, 497 N.E.2d 626,
635-38 (1986); Matter of Spring, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 845, 399 N.E.2d 499 (1979); In re of Hier,
18 Mass. App. Ct. 200, 210, 464 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1984).
315. Id.
316. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
317. Id. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
318. Id. at 42-51, 355 A.2d at 664-69.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668.
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doctrinal grounds for that right.3' Quinlan had been decided
solely on a federal and possibly a state constitutional basis, but
subsequent cases were decided on common law grounds.324
The common law protected the basic right of the individual to
control his or her own body,3" and competent adults
traditionally possessed the right to choose what treatment was
proper.3" The common law was not just added as a basis for
the right to refuse treatment resulting in death, but provided
the sole basis in lieu of the constitutional right to privacy.3 7
The constitutional right continued as a valid underpinning to
right to die doctrine, but no reason existed for applying the
constitutional protection because the common law protection
provided a sufficient basis for treatment refusals and
withdrawals. Such an approach differed from Massachusetts
where the courts utilized both constitutional and common law
doctrine.3"
The New Jersey courts3" also joined Massachusetts3' and
later Florida33' in recognizing four standard state interests, to
be weighed and balanced against the individual right to
privacy. However, the New Jersey courts after Quinlan
explicitly and strongly weighted the balance between state
interests and individual privacy rights strongly in favor of
323. Matter of Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 481 A.2d 1209 (NJ. 1985); Matter of Farrell, 108
N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987).
324. In re of Schiller, 148 NJ. Super. 168, 178, 372 A.2d 360, 366 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977); Conroy, 98 N.J. at 346, 486 A2d at 1221.
325. Conroy, 98 NJ. at 346, 486 A.2d at 1221.
326. Schiller, 148 NJ. Super. at 178, 372 A.2d at 366 (A guardian, who was appointed
for a mentally incapacitated patient, was entitled to make all life saving decisions).
327. Conroy, 98 NJ. at 348, 486 A2d at 1223.
328. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
329. See, e.g., Matter of Peter by Johanning, 108 NJ. 365, 380, 529 A.2d 419, 427
(1987).
330. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.
2d 417 (1977); See also supra notes 213-223 and accompanying text.
331. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, aff'd, 379 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1979); See also
supra notes 100-111 and accompanying text.
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individual privacy rights."' Generally, the right to self
determination outweighed any countervaling state interests,
especially where a patient was competent to make a
decision.333 In a circumstance where a patient existed in a
persistent vegetative state, no state interest could outweigh the
right not to choose treatment and die.3"
The New Jersey courts weighted the balance even more
heavily in favor of individual privacy by viewing three of the
four state interests in terms favoring the right to refuse
treatment."3  First, the state interest in protecting life, the
strongest of the four state interests, failed to be strong enough
standing alone to foreclose a patient, especially a competent
one, from deciding to forego treatment.33 Hence, the very life
that the state had an interest in protecting would have been
devalued by barring a patient, especially a competent one,
from making a choice to accept or reject treatment,337 because
the right to choose was a basic constituent of life being
protected by the state.33'  Though the Florida339  and
Massachusetts' courts recognized that the right to choose was
an important part of life, neither was as clear and explicit as
the New Jersey courts.
Two state interests de-emphasized by the New Jersey
332. Johanning, 108 N.J. at 380, 529 A.2d at 427; Matter of Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348-
54, 529 A.2d 404, 410-13 (N.J. 1987).
333. Matter of Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 353, 486 A.2d 1209, 1225 (N.J. 1985).
334. Johanning, 108 N.J. at 380, 529 A.2d at 427.
335. See, e.g., Matter of Peter by Johanning, 108 NJ. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
336. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223. The belief that people may make
personal choices concerning their own lives was a basic value and every person possessed a
strong interest in directing the course of his or her own life. Id at 350, 486 A.2d at 1223-24.
337. Matter of Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 349, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (1978).
338. Conroy, 98 NJ. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1223-24 (referring to Superintendent of
Belcherftown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977)).
339. See Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989); St.
Mary's Hospital v. Ramsey, 465 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362
So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
340. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986);
In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 728, 370 N.E.2d
at 417.
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courts were the prevention of suicide and the promotion of
the integrity of the medical profession." Preventing suicide
failed to be implicated in the decision to forego medical
treatment, because death resulted from the underlying disease,
not from self-inflicted wounds and no specific intent to die
existed. 2 The New Jersey courts never explained what read
like an automatic finding that suicide was not involved when
a person refused treatment knowing that death would result.
The New Jersey Supreme Court vaguely recognized that "[t]he
difference is between self-infliction or self-destruction and self-
determination. ' "
The New Jersey courts downplayed any conflict between
ethical responsibilities of medical professionals and patients
rights to forego treatment.' Where disease was incurable,
physicians were dedicated to easing the process of death and
not treating the patient.35  In addition, the right of the
individual to control his or her body outweighed concerns
about the medical profession.' The courts found that the
medical profession accepted such a balance because the
profession recognized the right to refuse life sustaining
treatment even when refusal would be deemed a "wrong
decision."' 7 Accordingly, the courts and medical profession
appeared to agree about the right to refuse treatment.'
However, even where courts vaguely recognized that potential
medical ethical conflicts might exist, the courts refused to
explain the conflicts or propose resolutions.
The one state interest that the New Jersey courts
recognized as potentially weightier than individual privacy was
341. See, e.g., Farrell, 108 N.J. at 349-50, 529 A.2d at 411-12.
342. Conroy, 98 NJ. at 350-51, 486 A.2d at 1224.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 351-52, 486 A.2d at 1224-25.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 351, 486 A.2d at 1225.
347. Matter of Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 350-51, 529 A.2d 404, 412 (1987).
348. Id.
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the protection of third parties.4 9 Third parties were viewed
in expansive terms of "the health, safety, or security of
others".35 The state interest was strong where children were
affected by the refusal treatment, though the negative impact
on the children of a parent's prolonged terminal illness could
be taken into consideration.35'
Although the right to refuse treatment was protected
strongly in circumstances where a patient was competent to
make a treatment choice,352 the incompetency of a patient
should not lessen or undermine that right. Incompetent
patients possessed the same right to forego treatment as
competent patients.3 3 While protecting the right to forego
treatment, the New Jersey courts developed different
procedures for determining when a patient may exercise that
right based on the condition and circumstances of the patient
involved. In developing the procedures, the courts
distinguished between competent patients,35 ' patients in a
vegetative state,355 and patients not in a vegetative state but
with limited capacities to understand their conditions and
interact with people around them.356 The courts developed
the different procedures to ensure that patients were not
abused, especially elderly patients in nursing homes.3" Hence,
the courts balanced the rights of less than competent patients
to forego treatment with the right to avoid the premature end
to treatment.
349. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349-50, 486 A.2d at 1225.
350. Id. at 353, 486 A.2d at 1225.
351. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 352, 529 A.2d at 412-13.
352. See, e.g., Conroy, 98 NJ. at 350, 486 A.2d at 1223.
353. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 373, 529 A.2d at 423.
354. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 335, 529 A.2d at 404.
355. See Matter of Peter by Johanning, 108 N.J. 365, 374, 529 A.2d 419, 424 (1987).
356. See Conroy, 98 N.J. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1231; In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168,
372 A.2d 360 (1977).
357. Johanning, 108 NJ. at 383, 529 A.2d at 428-29.
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VII. CALIFORNIA AND MissISSippi: ALTERNATIVE
BASES FOR TIlE FLORIDA RIGHT To Dm LAw
Although Massachusetts and New Jersey law provided
doctrinal bases for the Florida right to die law, a number of
other state and federal courts have rendered decisions
concerning the right to refuse treatment where death may
result.358 Massachusetts and New Jersey provided the strongest
precedent for the Florida court.359 However, the California
and Mississippi courts have perspectives on the right to die
that may be helpful to the Florida courts as the Florida courts
protect the right to forego treatment after Wons v. Public
Health Trust of Dade County.'
A. The California Perspective
The California courts6' are more protective of the right
to forego treatment than either the New Jersey or
Massachusetts courts. In California, patients rights are
paramount to state interests or societal considerations and are
accorded significantly greater weight in balancing
countervailing considerations. ' Even the state interest in the
preservation of life when forming the basis of moral belief of
physicians who oppose discontinuing treatment is outweighed
358. See, e.g., Rasmussen by Mitchell v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987);
Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1984); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980); Matter of
Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
359. See, e.g., supra notes 185-356 and accompanying text.
360. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985).
361. See, eg, Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 297; Barding, 163
Cal. App. 3d at 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 220; Barber v. Superior Court of State of California,
147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Conservatorship of Morrison,
206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
362. Baring, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 194-95, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225; Boui'ia, 179 Cal. App.
3d at 1139, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
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by the patient's right to self-determination.' The patient
controls potentially life threatening treatment decisions even
where the patient is neither comatose nor facing imminent
death.' Such an approach leads to a philosophy of judicial
self-restraint and as a result, California courts limit their
involvement in treatment decisions, allow patients to make
their own decisions relying on the advice of physicians.' The
decision to forego treatment is viewed by at least one
California court as "primarily ethical and not legal," especially
in the context of the persistently vegetative patient."
The basis for such an expansive view of the patient's
right to forego treatment and to control his or her body exists
in ideas about the relationship between people and medical
technology. Under California law, human beings are not
considered the passive subjects of medical technology and
techniques." Protecting self-determination in medical
treatment constitutes an important means for society to
respect the integrity of persons and individuals.' California
law reflects a concern about individuality and the protection
of individual dignity in an era when machines and those who
control machines could easily overcome individual desires in
the name of saving lives. Even the state interest in protecting
life involves assuring that medical decisions are made
appropriately for incompetent patients.' 9
The California courts give credence to medical decisions
made by individuals,37 but other societal and individual
considerations enter into determining whether to allow
363. Id at 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
364. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1139-40, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
365. Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 198, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 847
(Cal. Ct. App. 1988), cert denied sub nom. Drabick v. Drabick, 109 S. Ct. 399, reh'g denied,
109 S. Ct. 828 (1989).
366. Id. at 199-200, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
367. Id. at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
368. Id. at 208, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 854-855.
369. Id. at 209, 245 Cal. RpIr. at 855.
370 Id.
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treatment to be refused or withdrawn. Treatment may not be
refused or withdrawn in all circumstances. The California
courts recognize the existence of the four state interests37 1
applied by Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Florida courts.3"
However, the California courts neglect to apply the four state
interests explicitly or in depth. Instead, the four state interests
are mentioned and quickly counterbalanced by individual rights
considerations. A good example occurs in Bouvia v. Superior
Court" where the opinion mentions the four state interests
and then discusses the state interests in life and preventing
suicide in the context of quality of life and the patient's
general and physical and mental circumstances.374
The California courts apply a cost benefit analysis to
decide whether a patient should undergo therapy.375 The
courts review whether treatment is proportionate or
disproportionate in terms of benefits gained by the patient or
burdens suffered by the patient.376 Extremely painful and
intrusive therapy may be proportionate and therefore
acceptable if a cure is probable, but where the prognosis is
poor, even minimal treatment is disproportionate and
unnacceptable.3" The cost benefit analysis includes
considerations of how lGng treatment is likely to extend life
and the conditions under which life will be extended.378
Underlying the cost benefit analysis is an assumption that no
duty to provide or accept useless therapy exists, and useless
371. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 193, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), and Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d1 1127, 1142, 225
Cal. Rptr. 297, 304 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
372. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
740-41, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 38-42, 355 A.2d 647, 662-
64 (1987); Wons v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 500 So. 2d 679, 684 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1987).
373. Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
374. Id. at 1143-46, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-07.
375. Barber v. Superior Court of State of California, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1017-18,
195 Cal. Rptr 484, 490-91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
378. Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
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therapy includes any therapy which fails to improve a
prognosis."7
Quality of life remains as much a factor as quantity of
future life in determining whether to allow a patient to forego
treatment.' In Bouvia, the patient could live as long as
twenty years if the courts allowed forced feeding to continue. 1
The California Appellate Court criticized the trial court for
failing to give quality of life equal weight with quantity of
future life.82 The appellate court even suggested that quality
of life constituted a more significant consideration in deciding
to permit refusal of treatment than quantity of future life.'
Quality of life was diminished where the patient viewed her
life as hopeless, useless, unenjoyable, and frustrating, and
where the patient, helpless and unable to care for herself,
considered "her existence meaningless."'  In such
circumstances, a patient may be permitted to choose a
cessation of treatment and a significantly shortened life. The
California courts refused to allow a patient to face
unendurable suffering if the patient chose not to do so, stating
"we do not believe it is the policy of this state that all and
every life must be preserved against the will of the sufferer."'
The California courts favor the rights of patients so
strongly that a competent patient's desire to forego treatment
overrides medical professionals' ethical opposition to such a
decision.' Hence, medical professionals may be required to
withdraw treatment over their own strong opposition where
the transfer of the patient to an alternative facility is not
379. Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. The impact of future improvement on a
patient's ability to live a meaningful life is a component of prognosis. Id
380. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1141, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 304
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
381. Id at 1142, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
385. Id. at 1143, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
386. See supra note 362.
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possible.87 Even where a transfer may be possible, a
competent patient may require unwilling medical staff to
accede to a treatment decision that violates the moral beliefs
of the staff.' However, where a patient is incompetent, a
patient's conservator may be unable to force medical
personnel to acquiesce to a decision to withhold treatment,
and the conservator may be required to transfer the patient
to the care of alternative medical service providers who would
acquiesce to the conservator's decision.'
California law according expansive protection to the
right of the patient to choose to shorten his or her life by
refusing treatment is based on two underlying dichotomies.
First, the courts recognize a distinction between passive and
active behaviors.3" The courts are faced with rationalizing how
stopping life support equipment could be considered passive.
Stopping a machine seems to be active behavior, but the
courts analogize the machine to the manual provision of
therapy.391 Hence, each time the machine provides therapy
constitutes a separate administration of treatment and
therefore when the machine is stopped, subsequent discrete
treatments would be withheld, just as manual treatments not
provided would be withheld. Also, a distinction between
effecting a cure and gaining time to permit other treatments
to address a pathology is recognized.3" Gaining time is viewed
as useless if there is little likelihood of a cure in the future.
Both dichotomies allow the California courts to fashion a
protective standard for patient treatment decisions because
they recognize that at some point medical technology becomes
387. Bouvia,'179 Cal. App. 3d at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
388. Conservatorship of Morrison, 206 Cal. App. 3d 304, 310, 253 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534
(Cal. App. Ct. 1988).
389. Id. at 311, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34.
390. Barber v. Superior Court of State of California, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1017, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. -3d at 1145, 225 Cal. Rptr.
at 306.
391. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
392. Id.
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limited and the legal system's regulation of that technology
cedes to individual autonomy.3' Such a view is consistent with
the notion that the law recognizes that people control
technology and that individual decision making constitutes a
form of control over technology.
B. The Mississippi Perspective
Mississippi law, like California law, provides strong
protection for the right to forego treatment even when death
is likely to result. In In re Brown3" a hospital patient fell
victim to an attempted homicide, suffering life threatening
gunshot wounds.3" The victim acquiesced to surgery but
refused a blood transfusion on religious grounds.3' The
victim's daughter was charged with shooting the victim and
murdering the victim's daughter's father.3" A district attorney
sought to require that the victim accept a blood transfusion
because the victim served as the only eyewitness to both
crimes.3' The chances of survival without a blood transfusion
were fair, but improved to very good with a transfusion.3' The
Mississippi Supreme Court held that the victim possessed the
right to refuse the blood transfusion even when she served as
an important witness in the prosecution of major crimes.0'
The court based its holding on both the right to free
exercise of religion and the right to privacy." However, the
right of privacy alone was a sufficient basis for the decision,
as that right was viewed as particularly strong and personal
393. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490-91.
394. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033 (Miss. 1985).
395. Id. at 1035
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1036.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 1037.
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protecting the inviolability of the person.' The right to
privacy did not depend for its application on religious or other
beliefs, and could be claimed by individuals for "motives noble
or base."'4 3  The exercise of the right to privacy did not
require individuals to provide reasons. It was sufficient that
the person exercising the right to privacy was a human
being.' Rights such as the right to privacy could be
outweighed only by few particularly strong state interests.
Once a right to privacy was defined by a rule of law, any
limits to the right must also be created by rule of law, and the
right prevailed against mere public or private interests. Such
rights were immune from invasion by governmental authorities
or private people even when protecting those rights proved
inconvenient to society. 5 The Mississippi Supreme Court
buttressed its views about the free exercise of religion and
privacy by viewing those rights as protection against the
tyranny of the majority and the power of the state." Such a
perspective is broader than that of even the California courts
which viewed the right of privacy in the medical choice context
as allowing the individual a strong measure of control over
modern technology.
Because the right to privacy was accorded such strong
protection, the Mississippi Supreme Court limited the right
only in those very narrow circumstances when the refusal of
treatment created a great and imminent danger to society. 7
Such a danger failed to exist in Brown even where the state
needed the hospital patient to serve as a witness in a murder
trial. In Brown, the patient's right to refuse treatment was not
outweighed even by the state's interest in bringing a murderer
to trial, and the right to privacy prevailed even against the
402. Id. at 1040.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1036.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 1040.
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danger of a murderer escaping prosecution and possibly even
murdering again.'
VIII. FLORIDA RIGHT To DIE LAW AFTER Public
Health Trust v. Wons: RESOLVING THE
CONFUSION CREATED By Wons
The Florida Supreme Court in Public Health Trust of
Dade County v. Wons' evidenced a split of opinion involving
a number of right to die issues."'1 First, the ambiguities and
differences of opinions will be identified and examined, and
then potential resolutions utilizing out-of-state law will be
suggested.
A. Discrete State Interests or Factors
Indicating the Existence of a Compelling State Interest
The majority in Wons retreated from applying four
discrete state interests. ' In Perlmutter, the District Court of
Appeals identified and listed four interests applying each one
separately and explicitly."2  Though the Perlmutter court
mentioned only the preservation of life as a relevant interest
in the Perlmutter circumstances, the court applied each as one
of four counterweights to the right to refuse medical
treatment."3  In Bludworth, the Florida Supreme Court
identified the four counterweights as "the state's interests" '4
The majority in Wons downgraded the state interests to factors
or criteria indicating whether a compelling state interest
408. Id. at 1041.
409. Public Ilealth Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989).
410. Id. at 98.
411. Id. at 97.
412. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
413. Id. at 163.
414. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla.
1984).
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overrode the right to forego treatment.415 The factors failed
to provide "a bright line test," but were intended to be
considered "while reaching the difficult decision of when a
compelling state interest may override the basic constitutional
rights. .. .."" The dissent in Wons joined the majority by
characterizing the state interests as factors,"7 while the
concurring opinion continued to apply the interests as four
discrete and separate counterweights,"8 implying that no one
state interest alone may be weighty enough to overcome the
right to forego treatment.419  The Browning court also
evidenced confusion about the weight of the state interests.
The court characterized the interests both as interests and
factors, and stated explicitly that the four interests were not
exclusive."z
The ambiguous and conflicting characterization in Wons
of the original four interests identified in Perlmutter and
Bludworth indicates that the Florida Supreme Court is seeking
flexibility in balancing the right to forego treatment against
countervailing considerations. First, the factors
characterization allows for the easy addition of factors other
than the original four and for contouring the analysis
concerning countervailing circumstances to the needs of each
case. For instance, the Florida courts could weigh public
safety considerations such as prison security identified by the
Massachusetts court in Meyers ' or punishing wrongdoers as
in the homicide prosecution considered by the Mississippi
court in Brown."
415. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 103 (Overton, J., dissenting).
418. Id. at 98-101 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
419. Id. at 99 n.2 (majority opinion).
420. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
"While we do not attempt the task today, we suspect that the states interests could be
delineated in a longer and more precise list."' Id. at 266 n.1 1.
421. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 406-407 and accompanying text.
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By downgrading the state interests into factors or
criteria, the Florida Supreme Court implicitly accords greater
weight to the right to forego treatments.' z The court in Wons
implies that more than one factor or a variety or configuration
of factors would be needed to outweigh the right to choose no
treatment. 24 Hence, no one state interest could overcome the
right to privacy. The concurring opinion in Wons implies the
same even while continuing to refer to the factors as state
interests.4' The Florida Supreme Court appears to be inching
toward assigning the right to forego treatment the same
strength and importance accorded by the California courts
which recognize the four state interests but apply them
loosely.' By using factors instead of state interests, the
Florida courts could consolidate the four factors into one
particularly compelling factor similar to the approach of the
Mississippi courts, which bars refusal of treatment where great
and imminent public danger exists.427 By recognizing only one
compelling countervailing counter weight to the right to forego
treatment, the Mississippi courts elevated the right to choose
no treatment into an almost absolute right. Such an approach
would strenghten the right to forego treatment in Florida.
B. Abandoning Promoting the Integrity
of the Medical Profession
In Perlmutter, the District Court of Appeals referred to
Saikewicz when discussing the potential impact of withdrawal
of treatment on the medical profession.4" Implied in the
court's discussion was a conflict between the profession's
dedication to providing care and the role played by
423 Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989).
424 Id. at 97-98.
425 Id. at 100 (Ehrlich, CJ., concurring).
426. See supra notes 369-373 and accompanying text.
427. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (Miss. 1985).
428. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163-64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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professionals in disconnecting life support systems and
facilitating death. In Wons, the court did not conceive of the
conflict in such ethical terms. Instead, the majority4" and
dissent4" focused narrowly on the inconvenience suffered by
emergency medical personnel uncertain after, Wons about
when to accede to a patient's request to forego treatment.
The majority found that hospitals would have to tolerate the
burden of seeking a court order on a case by case basis.431
The concurring opinion found that the state interest in
preserving the integrity of the medical profession was the least
compelling and standing alone could never override the right
to refuse treatment.432 Browning confused the issue further
because the Browning court applied a strengthened state
interest in medical ethics when quality of life issues were
involved. 33
The majority's and dissent's concerns about the impact
of Wons on the medical profession did not directly involve
ethical problems or professionalism. Instead, they involved
insecurity and inconvenience, implying that the medical
professional considerations were not strong ones.4 4 Such an
approach differs little from that of the concurring opinion.
The majority and dissent deal with professional concerns as if
they lacked a compelling nature.435 Such an approach is not
surprising because even the Perlmutter court found that the
ethics of the medical profession were not endangered by the
right to forego treatment.4" Having trivialized concerns about
the medical profession to convenience and insecurity, the
Florida courts could omit the integrity of the medical
profession as a factor in deciding whether to allow patients to
429. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98 (Fla. 1989).
430. Id. at 104 (Overton, J., dissenting).
431. Id. at 98 (majority opinion).
432. Id. at 100-01 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
433. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
434. Wors, 541 So.2d at 98.
435. Id. at 100 (Ehrlich, CJ., concurring).
436. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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refuse treatment. Instead, either the Florida courts should
recognize, as the New Jersey courts have, that no conflict
exists between professional values and the right of a patient
to choose death37 or accept, as the California courts have,
that where such a conflict exists, the rights of the patient to
control his or her body almost invaribly take precedence over
the beliefs of medical professionals.'
C. The Preservation of Life As a Countervailing
Factor: A Weakening State Interest
The majority in Wons only mentioned the preservation
of life as a countervailing factor without explaining its
application to the circumstances of Wons.'39 The dissent
complained that the majority appeared to have accepted a
shift made by the District Court of Appeals in Ramsey away
from a sliding scale approach to determing when treatment
may be refused.' The dissent complained that the Perlmutter
court had restricted the right to forego treatment to those who
faced incurable and terminal diseases, and that the Wons
majority had failed to recognize the distinction between
treatment refusals by the terminally ill and the curable."1 The
dissent's complaint about the majority's lack of rationale on
such an important point was a valid one. The majority
appeared implicitly to broaden the rule of Perlmutter to those
patients who could be cured and live a normal life. Possibly
the concurring opinion reflected the thinking of the majority.
The concurring opinion conceded that " [t]he dissent may be
correct that the state's interest in the preservation of life
lessens where the prognosis is poor . ,,..2 However, the
437. See supra notes 343-347 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 385-388 and accompanying text.
439. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97.
440. Id. at 103 (Overton, J., dissenting).
441. Id. at 104.
442. Id. at 100 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
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concurring opinion continued by injecting quality of life into
the sliding scale, finding the cost of accepting medical
treatment may be too high for patients economically,
emotionally, or spiritually."3 The Browning court emphasized
the state interest in life when quality of life was a factor.' 4
The Florida Supreme Court appears uncertain about
how to apply the state interest in the preservation of life."5
The court appears to have moved away from the classic
Massachusetts approach of utilizing a sliding scale where the
state interest weakens as the prognosis dims and treatment
becomes more intrusive. Thus, the court may be moving
toward the California approach. First, the recognition by the
concurring opinion that quality of life is a critical factor in
weighing whether to allow a patient to refuse treatment is
similar to the California court in Bouvia.' In Bouvia, the
patient faced up to twenty years of unendurable suffering, and
in Wons, the patient faced a lifetime of knowing that she
sinned if she accepted a blood transfusion." In both Bouvia
and the concurring opinion in Wons, the patient's subjective
view of her quality of life was accorded great weight. Such an
approach is unlike that taken by the Massachusetts and New
Jersey courts which rejects quality of life as a factor in refusal
of treatment decisions. Also, the concurring opinion discussed
quality of life considerations in terms of costs of continuing
treatment. ' The California court utilized a cost benefit
analysis approach but not for quality of life considerations.
Instead, the California courts substituted a cost-benefit analysis
for a sliding scale analysis to determine whether the
circumstances permitted treatment to be refused."9
443. Id.
444. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 269-70 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1989).
445. See Wons, 541 So. 2d at 98-104.
446. See supra notes 379-384 and accompanying text.
447. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 100 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
448. Id.
449. See supra notes 374-378 and accompanying text.
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D. Suicide: The Nonsensical Factor
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Wons do more
than briefly mention the factor of preventing suicide. Such an
omission was surprising because the patient in Wons recovered
with treatment, and therefore death was not an irrevocable
prognosis."' By refusing the blood transfusion, the patient
chose the high liklihood that she would die and her choice
could appear to be a decision to end her own life. 1 The
concurring opinion implicitly recognized that suicide might be
involved in Wons when it briefly applied the state interest in
preventing suicide to the case, focusing on the patient's intent,
control, or lack of control over his or her disease, '52 the same
as the New Jersey court did in Farrell.453 Because the patient
possessed no desire to die, suicide was not involved.
However, both the New Jersey court and the concurring
opinion in Wons, overlooked a concious decision by a basically
healthy individual to accept the likelihood of death. The
dissent in Wons characterized such a choice as " a death which
is totally unnecessary.""4 4  Even the concurring opinion
conceded that the patient chose not to live if to do so
required receiving blood.455 The District Court of Appeals in
Browning faced the suicide issue more directly than the Wons
court. When quality of life becomes a consideration," the act
intuitively seems closer to suicide."56 However, the court goes
no further than recognizing a problem.
The Wons court and other out-of-state courts that have
tackled or avoided the application of the interest in preventing
450. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 97.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 100 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
453. Matter of Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 349-50, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (1987).
454. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 105 (Overton, J., dissenting).
455. Id. at 100.
456. In re Guardianship of Browning, 453 So. 2d 258, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
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suicide have refused to face directly the issue. The best the
concurring opinion in Wons could muster to explain away the
dilemma created by allowing a patient to choose death was to
latch onto the dichotomy between self-determined death and
death by natural causes. 57 If the patient in Wons refused a
blood transfusion and died, her death would be caused by her
disease and not by her decision to forego treatment. Such a
distinction appears strained, at best, because her decision to
forego treatment caused her death when the treatment would
have prevented death.
Possibly, the best approach to suicide is to avoid it as
a state interest. The Mississippi court in Brown avoided
discrete state interests or criteria and focused on imminent
public danger as a countervailing consideration to foregoing
treatment.458 The Mississippi court accorded the right to
choose treatment strong protection, finding that any limits on
the right must exist within the rule that created the right or is
part of "positive law" and not from extrinsic public interests.59
Such an approach focuses on the right to control one's body
and not on societal impacts except in narrow circumstances
The California court in Bouvia espoused a similar position to
that of the Mississippi court.' The court assserted that "the
fact that a desire to terminate one's life is probably the
ultimate exercise of one's right to privacy . .. ,"" but retreated
from that position by finding that the patient in Bouvia
possessed no specific intent to commit suicide. However, the
Bouvia court then dismissed the existence of lack of intent to
die as irrelevant by finding that if the right to forego
treatment existed, the motive for exercising the right was
irrelevant. The court stated, "[w]e find nothing in the law to
457. Wons, 541 So. 2d at 100 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
458. In re Brown, 478 So. 2d 1033, 1037 (Miss. 1985).
459. Id at 1036.
460. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1144, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
461. Id
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suggest the right to refuse medical treatment may be exercised
only if the patients' motives meet someone else's approval." 2
E. Protecting Third Parties: Preventing
Abandonment or Enhancing Family Life
The Wons court experienced its strongest split of
opinions when applying the factor of protecting innocent third
parties.* The dissent advocated prioritizing what was optimal
for the children of patients,' arguing children should have
two parents whenever possible, and the duty of a parent to
support a child overcomes the right of a parent to forego
treatment when treatment could improve the parent's
condition. Hence, a two parent family life in support of
children took precedence over the right to privacy. The
concurring opinion found that the state interest in protecting
third parties only outweighed the right to forego treatment
when a child was left with no support.'5 Thus, abandonment
became the standard and not optimal family life. So long as
an alternative caretaker such as another parent or other family
member existed, no abandonment occurred. It did not matter
that the children would not be as well off as long as some
care existed. The majority failed to indicate what standard
applied where the state interest in protecting the patient's
children did not outweigh a patient's right to forego blood
transfusions. The majority found that two parents were not
necessary, but also did not apply an abandonment criteria.'
Instead, the court implied that a determination would be made
on a case by case basis stating in a subsequent discussion, "no
blanket rule is feasible which could sufficiently cover all
462. Id. (emphasis in original text).
463. Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 98-99, 103-04 (Fla.
1989) (Overton, J., dissenting).
464. Id. at 103-04 (Overton, J., dissenting).
465. Id. at 99.
466. Id. at 98.
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occasions in which this situation will arise."'  Possibly, such an
approach comprises a middle ground between the optimal two
parent family and abandonment.
The concurring opinion injected into the analysis of the
impact foregoing treatment on a patient's children
considerations about the impact of treatment on the children.'
In Wons, the parent would be following her religious beliefs by
rejecting the transfusion, and by doing so, she set a principled
example for her children.' Her acceptance of treatment may
have had a negative impact on the children's views toward
their religion."' The concurring opinion was injecting
considerations similar to those discussed by the New Jersey
court in Farrell,471 where a dying mother's continued treatment
might have caused problems for her young children."7 The
impact of the trauma of treatment circumstances was accorded
as much importance as the absence of the parent after
death. 3 This approach seems advisable because the needs of
the children do not occur in a vacuum. A parent's medical
condition or the family's religious or philisophical commitments
impact the welfare of children. The lives of patients' children
are examined in more than just financial or emotional support
contexts.
X. CONCLUSION
The Florida Supreme Court evidences confusion in
Wons concerning important aspects of right to die law and
doctrine in Florida. The importance of the right to privacy
in relation to state interests remains unclear. The Florida
467. Id.
468. Id. at 100.
469. Id. at 102.
470. Id. at 100 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
471. Matter of Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 353, 529 A.2d 404, 413 (1987).
472. Id. at 353, 529 A-2d at 413.
473. Id. at 352, 529 A-2d at 412.
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courts appear to be moving away from their original doctrinal
cases, Massachusetts and New Jersey law, by implicitly
adopting the expansive doctrines of the California and
Mississippi courts. Such a move may herald greater
protections in the future for people suffering from chronic and
debilitating illnesses. Also, individuals who object to medical
care may have greater choices in the future, including the
choice to refuse care even if death will occur when complete
recovery is possible. Such people may be able to make such
a decision on their own personal terms without reference to
acceptable religious or philosophical beliefs.
The Florida Supreme Court's liberalizing re-direction of
right to die law, albeit implicit, comes at a critical time
because the United States Supreme Court will for the first
time consider the federal constitutional privacy right to
withdraw treatment in Cruzan v. Harmon.74 If the United
States Supreme Court restricts the federal constitutional
protection of medical choice, Wons, Florida, and-out-of-state
cases on which Wons builds become critical for continued
protection of the right to die in Florida. The Florida Supreme
Court will have to face the accumulated doctrine from Florida
precedent, Massachusetts, New Jersey, California, Mississippi,
and even other jurisdictions in the context of state
constitutional and common law."'
474. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 3-7.
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